In Colombia, with one year remaining in President Gustavo Petro’s term, the political assessment of his administration leaves a bitter taste—even among some former supporters.
Beyond debates about his intentions or the relevance of his agenda, what stands out is a failure of execution. The sweeping transformations he promised remain unrealized, largely due to one key factor: the political isolation of the Executive Branch, stemming from its inability to build lasting alliances beyond the inner circle of the Historic Pact.
Petro’s “non-politics”—understood as a rejection of negotiation, a disdain for consensus, and a deep distrust of all forms of opposition—has come at a steep cost for Colombia.
Indeed, Gustavo Petro fell into the trap set by the most recalcitrant opponents of his proposals, leaving the country paralyzed, with little reason for optimism about achieving the change not only promised but voted for by over 11.2 million Colombians in 2022.
Colombia and the consequences of President Petro’s ‘non-politics’
From the start of his term, Petro adopted an ambivalent stance toward Congress and other branches of government. Though he initially formed a coalition including factions from liberalism, conservatism, and independent parties, that alliance quickly unraveled. The president failed—or refused—to maintain bridges with these sectors, and his relationship with the Legislature grew increasingly strained.
The structural reforms he proposed—in health, pensions, education, and labor—required solid congressional majorities. Yet instead of compromising, negotiating, or seeking agreements, the government chose confrontation, falling into the trap set by the most reactionary opponents of change.
Those who opposed him, even from progressive ranks, were labeled traitors or enemies. Politics became trench warfare, sidelining dialogue.
The result has been predictable: reforms have stalled, and the administration has governed through limited decrees or diluted proposals. Congress, which should be a space for building consensus, became a minefield where every major vote ends in defeat or indefinite delays.
The consequence is clear: the failure of politics has paralyzed the country. Today, one year before the end of the term of Colombia’s first leftist president, the nation is completely gridlocked with no clear options.
Polarization as a method
Compounding this logic is a phenomenon that has defined Colombian politics in recent years: extreme polarization. Petro has not only governed from the left but has made confrontation with “the elites,” “the traditional press,” and “the political class” part of his permanent narrative.
While this rhetoric worked as an electoral strategy, governing demands more than maintaining a mobilized base—something the left, upon reaching institutions, recurrently fails to grasp.
In this climate of perpetual division, every critique is interpreted as malicious, and every oversight effort is seen as sabotage. Far from promoting pluralism, the government has fueled hostility, impoverishing public debate. Politics has been replaced by finger-pointing.
This has weakened not only the Executive but the democratic system itself. When the ability to listen, compromise, and recognize limits vanishes, politics becomes a solitary, sterile, and self-referential exercise.
Consequences of the Petro Government’s isolation and ‘non-politics’ for Colombia
The most visible outcome of this “non-politics” is legislative stagnation. Nearly three years into his term, none of the major social reforms have been fully approved. Even those that advanced, like the pension reform, did so amid legal disputes and without the consensus needed for long-term sustainability.
Moreover, isolation has created a governance vacuum. Without solid congressional backing, fluid dialogue with mayors and governors, or clear alliances with productive or social sectors, the government has lost room to maneuver. Many of its promises are now stalled—not for lack of ideas, but for lack of agreements.
There is also a political cost that will surface in the 2026 elections. The administration’s erosion–compounded by its disconnect with centrist and center-left factions–undermines progressivism as a political project. The lack of concrete results may ultimately benefit conservative sectors promising order and stability amid the preception of chaos.
A recurring mistake in Colombia
This error is not new in Colombia’s recent history. Previous governments also isolated themselves in their own circles or rejected politics as an exercise in dialogue.
Paradoxically, however, Petro came to power promising a different, more inclusive, and participatory politics. Instead, he has repeated the pattern of the caudillo–distrusting everyone and governing from the public square.
With one year left in his term, the government has little time and scant political strength to reverse this. Yet the upcoming 2026 legislative and presidential elections offer little room for correction.
If Petro fails to reset his relationship with Congress and other political actors, his reforms will gather dust, and his legacy will be reduced to fiery speeches and broken promises.
Ideological purity—speaking only to the converted—maintains an aura that barely extends beyond the opposition. In a liberal political system, governance relies on institutions.
Certainly, the Colombian state was fortified against a potential leftist presidential victory. Reactionary opponents of change control many power structures, often using corruption as a tool—but a seasoned politician like Gustavo Petro already knew this.
Yet he could not navigate that landscape or the rules of the democratic state, which–not just in Colombia–limits radical changes challenging the hegemony of economic power—a sector that for decades has plundered and subjugated the underprivileged to unspeakable degrees.
Inequality in Colombia: Without politics, there is no transformation
Gustavo Petro held a unique opportunity: to steer Colombia toward social transformation with popular backing. But to achieve it, he needed to engage in politics—not just mobilize streets or denounce adversaries, but sit at the table, compromise, and build majorities.
That is perhaps his cardinal error. By rejecting politics as a space for negotiation and agreement, the government has condemned itself to paralysis—and in doing so, squandered a crucial part of its historic capital.
Governing is not just proposing; it is also listening, persuading, and, above all, building coalitions. Something Petro, thus far, has refused or failed to do.
The maximalism of seeking to radically transform the country in four years without solid congressional majorities was an act of political blindness with evident consequences: failure.
Those who falsely threatened three years ago to “leave Colombia” if Petro won are now rubbing their hands, savoring the defeat of the first proposal for real change in Colombian politics.
The country knows change will not come. But beyond the bad faith of those who have always ruled this cruel, exclusionary, elitist Macondo—and its owners counting fortunes in dollars—the Petro government’s clumsiness bears significant responsibility for its own failure.
The coming months will see tensions between those who know they have won by neutralizing the government and the futile tantrums of those within it now scrambling to salvage their future image.
In the end, sadly, the winners are those who wanted no change: the political spokespeople for those who have benefited for decades from an unequal Colombia, making it one of the world’s most unequal countries. And this is not what over 11.2 million Colombians voted for in 2022.