Roughly three months after the Colombian government granted peace manager status to 16 former members of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the Ombudsman’s Office initiated a high-profile legal challenge that has rippled through the country’s political institutions. The agency filed a petition before the Council of State asking that Resolution 327 of 2025 be declared void, arguing that the measure contains serious legal flaws, institutional risks, and contradictions with Colombia’s transitional justice framework.
The truth is that the “peace manager” designation has created significant tension within President Gustavo Petro’s “total peace” project because it includes former paramilitary commanders with serious histories of human rights violations and documented cases of criminal recidivism.
For political sectors, victims’ organizations, and the Ombudsman’s Office, this move sends a contradictory message: While the government seeks to advance negotiations with armed groups and close long cycles of violence, it is granting institutional roles to individuals who have not fully complied with commitments related to truth, reparations, and guarantees of nonrepetition.
This has sparked a broader debate about the ethical and legal limits of the total peace policy and raised questions about whether these designations genuinely strengthen reconciliation or, on the contrary, undermine public trust in the state and its ability to uphold justice.
A presidential decision under fire: How a government decree sparked a national debate
The resolution, issued by the administration of President Gustavo Petro, placed several notorious ex-paramilitary commanders in an official conflict-resolution role. Among the appointees are Salvatore Mancuso, Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (“Jorge 40”), and Diego Fernando Murillo (“Don Berna”), names that, for many Colombians, remain tied to the worst abuses of the internal armed conflict.
In its legal filing, the Ombudsman’s Office argues that the decree “omits supervision by judicial authorities and the effective participation of victims” and creates “a serious affectation to the political and social order” by granting institutional standing to individuals responsible for grave human rights crimes. To the Ombudsman, the controversy goes beyond executive overreach, it touches the very core of whether Colombia’s peace-building strategies can coexist with accountability, truth-telling, and safeguards for victims.
Why the Ombudsman’s Office is seeking annulment: ambiguous roles, transitional justice conflicts, and concerns about recidivism
At the heart of the Ombudsman’s request is a detailed critique of how the decree was designed. According to the petition, Resolution 327 fails to clearly describe the duties, authority, and boundaries that these peace managers would have, an omission that the agency argues violates basic administrative and procedural standards.
The Ombudsman’s Office notes that the government created a Technical Committee to accompany the peace managers, but that this body includes only government delegates and the ex-AUC appointees. It does not include victims, judicial authorities, or independent oversight, a structure the agency says undermines transparency and weakens guarantees of nonrecurrence.
A second — and even more sensitive — issue involves the transitional justice system. The filing states that the decree conflicts with obligations established under Law 975 of 2005 and Decree 1175 of 2016, which regulate how individuals formerly linked to armed groups may receive benefits or assume official roles. Several of the designated peace managers were actually expelled from the Justice and Peace process for failing to tell the truth, for not contributing to reparations, or for allegedly continuing criminal activity after demobilization.
The Ombudsman’s Office warned that naming individuals with this background could lead to what victims’ groups call symbolic revictimization, since many still have unresolved commitments to truth and justice. In the petition, the agency emphasized that granting institutional responsibilities to figures with “serious criminal backgrounds” without sufficient judicial control “mines the moral authority of the state.”
The request also asks the Council of State to temporarily suspend the decree while the case is reviewed — arguing that allowing the resolution to remain active could affect public trust in institutions and expose communities to unnecessary risk.
The former AUC commanders at the center of the controversy
While all 16 appointees are former members of the AUC, a few stand out for their notoriety and influence:
Salvatore Mancuso
A former top commander of the AUC’s Northern Bloc, Mancuso has long been one of the most visible paramilitary leaders in Colombia’s transitional justice landscape. His testimonies have linked paramilitary structures to political, military, and business elites. Victims’ organizations, however, have repeatedly questioned gaps or inconsistencies in his disclosures. Although he has expressed willingness to contribute to national truth-telling processes, victims’ groups have frequently questioned inconsistencies in his statements and his partial fulfillment of reparations.
Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (“Jorge 40”)
Known for overseeing operations in the Caribbean region, Tovar Pupo’s forces were implicated in massacres, displacements, and electoral interference. His extradition to the U.S. and subsequent return raised unresolved questions about his pending obligations to victims.
Diego Fernando Murillo (“Don Berna”)
Once a dominant criminal and paramilitary actor in Medellin, Don Berna maintained influence in urban criminal structures even after the AUC demobilization. Critics argue that his full criminal network has never been sufficiently disclosed.
Other appointees include figures such as Carlos Mario Jiméenez (“Macaco”) and Fredy Rendon (“El Aleman”), whose names remain linked to regional control, drug trafficking, and political pressure. Media reports emphasize that several still face public distrust and allegations of continued influence in illegal economies.
The Ombudsman’s Office argues that giving such individuals an institutional platform could produce unpredictable effects in local communities, especially in areas where these men once exercised territorial control.
Petro’s rationale: Why his administration says peace managers are key to ‘Total Peace’
The Petro administration has defended the appointments as part of its broader “Total Peace” strategy. According to officials, the idea is not to integrate former AUC leaders into political roles but to use their unique regional knowledge, networks, and familiarity with armed structures to help open communication channels in conflict-affected zones.
Government sources have suggested that peace managers could assist with, identifying local conditions necessary for dialogue, facilitating contact with armed groups, or supporting community-level de-escalation initiatives. Some within the administration argue that ex-commanders can provide insights into territorial dynamics that the state cannot access alone, particularly in regions where official institutions have historically been absent.
However, human rights groups and the Ombudsman’s Office counter that no peace strategy can override obligations to victims. The Ombudsman’s petition stresses that peacebuilding must be “compatible with justice, truth, and the ethical foundations of public institutions. The dispute exposes a deeper dilemma within Colombia’s peace agenda: Can reconciliation involve individuals who have not fully complied with transitional justice requirements, or who maintain unresolved questions about their past conduct?
A crucial test for Colombia’s democratic institutions
The Council of State will ultimately determine whether Resolution 327 remains in effect or is struck down. Its ruling will have implications not only for these 16 individuals, but for the broader future of Colombia’s peace policy.
If the resolution is annulled, it could reinforce the message that transparency, judicial oversight, and victim participation must remain nonnegotiable pillars of any peace initiative. If upheld, it may allow the Petro administration to continue experimenting with unconventional mechanisms under “Total Peace,” albeit at the risk of eroding public confidence in transitional justice.
For the Ombudsman’s Office, the principle is clear: Peace cannot move forward if it undermines victims’ rights or weakens the credibility of State institutions. As the legal challenge emphasizes, peace is not only a matter of negotiation, it is a matter of trust.