In modern sports, Moneyball is defined as the pursuit of the undervalued asset, and is a strategy Colombia must adapt for a chance at winning the 2026 World Cup. It is a philosophy that prioritizes evidence over intuition, and for a nation historically haunted by the agonizing narrative of lacking “five cents for the peso,” it may be the missing ingredient.
As the national team looks toward North America, applying a Moneyball strategy to Colombia offers a way to exorcise the ghosts of past failures; by replacing fatalism with data and trading emotional volatility for calculated marginal gains, the squad can finally bridge the gap between contending and conquering in 2026.
Penalty shootouts haunt the psyche of the Colombian football fan. Costly eliminations against England at the 2018 World Cup and against Argentina in the 2021 Copa America have essentially traumatized the country. This fatalism aligns with the myth that Colombia is always missing “five cents for the peso, always close but ultimately short of glory.
We look at both the 2021 and, particularly, the 2018 elimination on penalties with pain; however, the book The Numbers Game offers a different perspective. The numbers show that looking at penalties as a lottery is a coping mechanism, an excuse for failure. Penalties can be quantified. The book posits that penalties have a 77% conversion rate, almost a sure thing when compared to the 12% conversion rate of open play shots.
Soccernomics proposes an ‘antidote’ for penalty kicks. The book proposes that a penalty duel is not a duel of nerves, but instead an application of Game Theory, specifically the Minimax theorem developed by John von Neumann. The difference between winning and losing a penalty shootout is more often than not a crib sheet, not divine intervention.
The defining proof, which still holds true today, occurred during the 2006 World Cup quarterfinal between Germany and Argentina. German goalkeeper Jens Lehmann consulted a piece of paper that was provided by analysts, which he tucked into his sock that had all the details of the Argentine kickers. Germany went on to win that shootout but ultimately lost to Italy in the semifinals.
In the 2008 Champions League final, Chelsea used the work of Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, which showed that Man. United keeper Edwin van der Sar dived to a kicker’s “natural side”. Chelsea’s players followed the math perfectly until Nicolas Anelka deviated from the economist’s advice, kicked to van der Sar’s strong side, and lost the European Cup.
🇩🇪🇦🇷 Quartas de final da Copa do Mundo de 2006: quando Jens Lehmann parou a Argentina
— Copa do Mundo FIFA🏆 (@fifaworldcup_pt) May 19, 2024
In previous articles, it has been detailed that Colombia’s 2026 squad has the talent and social cohesion to produce elite performances against some of the best teams in the world. To achieve success in 2026, Colombia must add something else: Marginal gains, as data and a moneyball-focused strategy could serve as the missing piece in the puzzle to allow Colombia to bring the trophy back to Bogota.
The Argentina trap
If Colombia produces an exceptional performance in the group stages by winning the group, advancing past the round of 32 and 16, and matching its greatest ever performance in a World Cup ever by reaching the Quarters, the rival could be World Champion Argentina.
By now, Argentina has become the most feared team in the world when it comes to penalty shootouts, mainly thanks to their goalkeeper, Emiliano ‘Dibu’ Martinez. The Argentine #1 has a shootout success rate of close to 50%, and is seen as an emotional disruptor, a goalie who weaponizes the small margins of the penalty area.
Martinez is an expert in the dark arts, a unique goalkeeper who has already won the mental game before the shootout has even begun. Technically, however, his success is rooted in extreme patience, as he waits until the kicker’s penultimate step to commit his weight, allowing him to generate massive lateral thrust only once the shooter has revealed where his shot was taken.
Dibu and the world champions could be a massive challenge to Colombia’s hopes of making history in North America. To counter Martinez, The Numbers Game proposes opposition players implementing a “Zero Engagement” protocol. Players are encouraged to simply not give the goalie the attention he is trying to draw to himself.
The book describes that anxiety creates a fixation on the target, where the effort not to look at something, which in this case would be Martinez, makes the brain hyper aware of it, causing players to inadvertently shoot directly toward the keeper. If Colombia met Martinez and company, as they did in 2021, science says Nestor Lorenzo’s staff should prepare the players not to engage with Dibu’s antics.
Technically, science also recommends using power over finesse to beat Martinez. Since ‘Dibu’ waits for the kicker to commit his weight, science would advise against stuttering or hoping before execution against Martinez. Instead, prioritizing power and shooting toward the corners should be the preferred strategy, preferably the upper quadrants of the goal, as Martinez possesses exceptional reach and cover for low zones.
Inswung corners, a key moneyball statistic for Colombia?
A trend viewers should expect to see at the 2026 World Cup is that of set-piece goals. By the beginning of December 2025, there had been 125 set-piece goals in the Premier League, with Arsenal leading the league with 12 set-piece goals. This is no coincidence.
To understand why set pieces, the difference between intuition and data needs to be studied. Soccernomics details an instance where, in 2011, Manchester City’s data analysts studied over 400 corners and concluded that inswingers, meaning kicks that curved toward the goal, were statistically more dangerous than outswingers. This conclusion was then presented to head coach Roberto Mancini, a former player who, according to the book, relied heavily on his gut feeling and tradition.
Mancini dismissed the data, arguing that outswingers were more effective because they allowed players to run toward the ball and generate power.
The book says Mancini, a European Cup winner with Italy, suffered from the “availability heuristic,” meaning he believes outswingers create aesthetically pleasing headers, whereas inswingers create chaos in the box. Despite initial resistance from the manager, City’s analysts persisted and convinced Mancini’s assistant manager, David Platt, to implement the strategy.
The result was undeniable as in the 2011-2012 season City scored 15 set-piece goals, the highest in the league. 10 of them came from inswung executions, including the Vincent Kompany header that was decisive for their first title in decades.
La hinchada eligió:
Hasta el momento #ElGolFCF de 2018 fue el de Yerry Mina ante Inglaterra en Rusia 2018.
📽️Cortesía: @FIFAcom pic.twitter.com/gCxJH6DbVf
— Selección Colombia (@FCFSeleccionCol) August 10, 2018
This is a moneyball statistic Colombia could exploit, as the data behind set-piece executions is undeniable. Outswingers generate a higher volume of headers, but these headers usually take place further from the goal line, resulting in a lower expected goals value.
Inswingers, on the other hand, have a direct goal conversion rate of 2.7%, compared to the 2.2%of outswingers. In a low-scoring sport such as football, this 0.5% difference is massive and could be a lifesaver for teams that perfect inswinger executions.
In 2026, Colombia has a luxury most teams don’t have: having the correct personnel to exploit the inswing data. James Rodriguez, Jhon Arias, and Juan Fernando Quintero, all poised to be in the World Cup squad, are widely regarded as set-piece specialists who can deliver perfect crosses to their teammates.
This is why we should expect Colombia to start taking on inswing kicks, as players such as Yerry Mina (1.95m), Davinson Sanchez (1.87m), and Jhon Lucumi (1.87m) can create extra danger.
The national team already proved how effective this strategy could be, as it was the top set-piece scorer at the 2024 Copa America. So much so that the goal that sent La Tricolor to the final of that tournament was scored by Jefferson Lerma from a set-piece.