The number of people belonging to illegal armed groups in Colombia reached 27,000 in January of this year. The figure represents a 23.4% increase compared with levels recorded two years earlier and confirms a trend of sustained growth that has been consolidating since the end of the pandemic.
The data, contained in a recent report by the Ideas for Peace Foundation, reflects the ability of these structures to strengthen themselves amid a context marked by dialogues, partial ceasefires, and a still-limited state presence across large regions of the country.
The increase is neither uniform nor driven by a single cause. FARC dissident groups, the Gulf Clan, and ELN account for most of the growth, fueled by territorial disputes, illegal economies, and active recruitment processes.
Beyond the absolute number of members, the report warns of an expansion of their territorial and social influence, with direct impacts on security, local control, and the daily lives of thousands of communities.
Colombia’s armed groups grow 23.4% in two years, reaching 27,000 members
From the Catatumbo region to the Nariño Pacific coast, illegal armed groups have consolidated their presence in areas where weak state presence has been exploited to expand their structures.
The largest organization remains the Gulf Clan, also known as the Gaitanista Army of Colombia, which grew from approximately 7,500 members in 2024 to nearly 9,840 by the end of 2025, representing an increase of close to 30% in a single year.
This growth, faster than that of other illegal forces, makes it a central player in the country’s criminal economies and in the dispute over drug trafficking routes and territorial control.
The ELN guerrilla group (National Liberation Army) also experienced an increase in its ranks, rising from just over 6,200 to more than 6,800 members, underscoring its ability to retain and recruit members despite military pressure and negotiation processes with the government.
Dissident factions of the former FARC, fragmented into several structures such as the Central General Staff (EMC) and the General Staff of Blocs and Fronts (EMBF), also reported significant increases, with growth rates exceeding 20% in some cases.
The phenomenon is not limited to armed groups with a rural presence or those operating in border areas. According to the FIP report, support networks — civilian entities that collaborate logistically or financially with these organizations without necessarily bearing arms — grew even more than combatants, suggesting deeper penetration into the daily lives of communities and urban centers. This expansion of the illegal groups’ social base amplifies their operational capacity and complicates state action.
The expansion of illegal armed groups in Colombia underscores that the internal armed conflict remains one of the main threats to the country’s stability and security. The figure of 27,000 members is the manifestation of a structural problem that combines illicit economies, institutional weaknesses, and local dynamics of violence.
The challenge for the next government and Colombia’s institutions is enormous: Design responses that not only contain armed expansion but also address the root causes that allow these groups to reproduce and entrench themselves within the social fabric.
#AnálisisFIP| 🧵 Récord en disputas y aumento del 23% en miembros de grupos armados: lo que dejó 2025 y las alertas para 2026
Compartimos esta cápsula de análisis con el consolidado final de seguridad en 2025 y los escenarios que enfrentará el país en este año electoral. 👇 pic.twitter.com/A20BiX8NAz
— Fundación Ideas para la Paz (@ideaspaz) January 30, 2026
The landscape of armed groups left behind by Gustavo Petro’s presidency
The growth of armed groups has had tangible impacts on the lives of thousands of people. Disputes between criminal organizations and guerrilla groups have led to an increase in forced displacement, confinement, and restrictions on the mobility of entire communities.
Sectors such as civilian infrastructure, health services, and freedom of movement have been affected by attacks and actions aimed at consolidating territorial control, especially in areas with a historical presence of these structures.
The FIP report also warns that the increase in the number of members has been accompanied by a higher frequency of clashes between armed groups, as well as actions against the security forces.
In several regions, internal fractures within organizations have resulted in violent disputes that worsen the security outlook and complicate pacification efforts. The most recent figures indicate that clashes between these forces rose significantly in 2025, marking one of the highest peaks in more than a decade.
In this context, state policy faces contradictions and limitations, acknowledged even by some presidential hopefuls — such as Roy Barreras — who have emerged from the orbit of the current president.
The negotiation tables opened with certain groups under the banner of “total peace” have not prevented these same actors from increasing their recruitment capacity and territorial consolidation and in fact, are strongly criticized by the opposition, which holds them responsible for this growth.
The FIP report notes that neither military actions nor dialogue processes have succeeded in halting the growth of these structures. This reality raises questions about public policy strategies, their design, and their real effectiveness in confronting complex and adaptive criminal networks.