In the past three years, the main armed groups operating in Colombia have seen a significant increase in their ranks: More than 10,000 new members have joined their structures between 2022 and 2025, according to intelligence data revealed and reported by national media outlets.
This trend places the country at a difficult crossroads, as it reflects the persistence of the armed conflict, the weakness of state presence in certain peripheral regions — where the power of these armed groups continues to consolidate — and the increasing sophistication of criminal financing models.
Furthermore, the figures once again cast doubt on President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” program, which so far has not yielded concrete results in the form of firm commitments from these criminal organizations and now faces an upcoming election year that could further strain its viability.
Colombia’s illegal armed groups grow by 10,000 in three years
When President Gustavo Petro’s government took office in August 2022, available reports estimated that illegal armed groups had around 15,120 members under arms. By 2023, the reported figures had risen to 18,334, and by the second half of 2025, they had reached 25,278 in total — representing an increase of nearly 67% in just three years.
It is important to clarify that these numbers include both combatants and auxiliary supporters, so the composition of each group varies, and the data should be considered estimates. Nonetheless, they are useful for understanding the upward trend of this reality.
This increase has occurred within the framework of what the government calls its Total Peace policy — a program promoted by the Colombian presidency that includes strengthening dialogue with insurgent organizations as well as conducting military and police operations.
However, the strategy has failed to curb the expansion. On the contrary, the growth of armed structures has accelerated in areas where the state maintains a weak presence, generating new forms of territorial control and violence dynamics.
What explains this expansion?
Several factors converge to explain this phenomenon, and none of them act in isolation. First are the criminal economies: Drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, smuggling, and arms trafficking remain the most solid sources of funding for armed groups.
These economies allow them not only to finance their logistics, weapons, and supplies but also to attract new members with the promise of income and protection. The Minister of Defense stated that “the violent criminal resilience of these groups stems from criminal finances, from criminal economies.”
Second is the absence or weakness of the state in vast parts of the country: Regions such as Cauca, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, Catatumbo, southern Nariño, and the border with Venezuela are areas with limited state control, scarce social infrastructure, and few formal employment opportunities — conditions that create a “vacuum” that armed groups exploit.
Third, there is a phenomenon of fragmentation and recomposition of armed structures: Former factions and dissidents that emerged after the signing of the peace accord with FARC have reestablished or expanded, often blending guerrilla, drug-trafficking, and paramilitary logic. In this context, the security and income these groups offer become appealing to vulnerable population sectors.
In addition, negotiation or ceasefire initiatives with certain groups may have opened windows of opportunity for their reorganization without simultaneously imposing an effective security counterbalance. Thus, while dialogue is pursued, some players have taken advantage of the process to rebuild networks and strengthen territorial influence.
Implications of the growth of armed groups in Colombia for society
The growth of armed groups is not a mere bureaucratic matter: It carries real and profound consequences for security, the rule of law, and the daily lives of millions of Colombians. The increase in members translates into a greater capacity to commit homicides, forced displacements, community confinements, child recruitment, attacks, and clashes with security forces or rival groups.
Regions that were already socially fragile now find themselves even more exposed: The presence of a strong armed group in a territory implies control over drug-trafficking routes, mineral extraction, extortion practices, and a pervasive shadow over the community. Where the state fails to provide social programs, recognition of rights, and economic alternatives, the armed presence becomes a de facto option.
For the government’s peace strategy, this scenario raises major questions: Negotiating with illegal groups cannot overlook the need to dismantle their illicit economies, restore state presence, foster transitions toward sustainable economic alternatives, and guarantee rights for the most vulnerable populations. Only through a comprehensive approach can there be hope of reversing a trend that is already gaining strength.
Colombia facing its own reflection — beyond political polarization
The expansion of illegal armed groups cannot be seen as a peripheral or isolated phenomenon confined to certain regions; it is a structural problem connected to multiple dynamics — economic, social, territorial, and political.
The fact that more than 10,000 new members have joined in just three years demands recognition that Colombia is not merely in a pause of its armed conflict but rather facing a new phase of recomposition that endangers both the progress achieved in recent years and the prospects for lasting peace.
Experts in this field point out that the State’s efforts must go beyond military operations: They must strengthen institutions in neglected territories, rebuild damaged social fabric, create real paths to inclusion and economic alternatives to drug trafficking and illegal mining, and simultaneously break the bonds of legitimacy that some of these groups enjoy with certain communities.
Otherwise, the current dynamics — growth in ranks, territorial expansion, and rising income among illegal structures — could evolve into a new cycle of violence that prolongs the shadow of armed conflict into the future.
This is a complex moment for Colombia, on the threshold of a heated electoral campaign that—with deep polarization—will make security a key and divisive issue. What is certain is that the growth of armed groups forces a rethinking of both security and peace strategies.
The situation demands that society, the state, and the international community take note of what is happening in the most remote corners of a country where, as Rodrigo Londoño — the former top commander of the now-defunct FARC — told this outlet: “It is easier to form an armed group than to start an economic enterprise.”