Can Colombia’s Right Unite Before the 2026 Presidential Race?

Written on 12/15/2025
Natalia Falah

Later today, the Democratic Center (Centro Democratico) will take a decisive step in shaping Colombia’s 2026 presidential race. Around 5 p.m. local time, the party is expected to announce which of three prominent senators — Maria Fernanda Cabal, Paloma Valencia, or Paola Holguin — will become its official presidential candidate. Along with the name, party leaders will also release the internal polling that guided the decision, an effort to underline transparency and internal legitimacy.

Yet while the announcement will settle an important internal contest, it does not resolve the deeper strategic dilemma facing the party and the broader Colombian right. The most consequential question is no longer who the Democratic Center’s candidate will be, but whether that candidate should participate in the interparty consultations scheduled for March and under what conditions. At the center of that debate stands former president Alvaro Uribe Velez, whose public remarks in recent weeks reveal both caution and uncertainty about the path forward.

The weight of Uribe’s influence: A party betting on unity and interparty consultations

Alvaro Uribe remains the most influential figure within the Democratic Center. His political judgment carries enormous weight, both among party members and within the conservative electorate. For months, Uribe publicly expressed interest in a broad consultation that could unify right-wing and centrist forces behind a single presidential option capable of defeating the left in 2026.

However, his position has evolved as the political landscape has shifted. In public interviews and radio appearances, Uribe has acknowledged that a consultation only makes sense if it produces genuine unity. He has warned that a fragmented consultation — most likely to be divided into multiple ideological or personal camps — would be ineffective and potentially harmful. According to Uribe, dispersing votes among loosely connected groups weakens the opposition rather than strengthening it.

This reassessment gained urgency after several key political figures made it clear they would not participate in a shared consultation. The withdrawal of names such as Abelardo de la Espriella and Sergio Fajardo effectively dismantled the idea of a broad, cross-sector vote that could include the entire nonleft spectrum. Uribe has publicly recognized that, under these conditions, the original vision of a large unifying consultation no longer aligns with political reality.

Rather than insisting on a symbolic exercise, Uribe has suggested that alternative mechanisms — such as agreed-upon polls or surveys — might be more effective in identifying a single competitive candidate. His public statements emphasize pragmatism over formality: Unity matters more than the method used to achieve it.

What the Democratic Center brings to the table

The Democratic Center enters this moment with both strengths and vulnerabilities. It remains one of Colombia’s most organized and recognizable political parties, with a loyal voter base and a strong presence in Congress. The fact that its presidential shortlist is composed entirely of women is also politically significant, signaling generational renewal and an effort to broaden its appeal.

Uribe himself has been careful to publicly distance himself from the internal selection process. He has repeatedly stated that all three candidates are qualified and deserving, and that his responsibility is to preserve the credibility of the party rather than influence the outcome. This restraint reflects an awareness that overt intervention could deepen internal divisions or undermine the legitimacy of the eventual nominee.

Still, once the candidate is announced, the party must decide how aggressively it seeks alliances beyond its own ranks. Participating in a consultation could offer visibility and a path toward broader coalitions. Staying out, however, could allow the Democratic Center to preserve its identity, avoid internal friction, and negotiate alliances later from a position of strength.

Uribe’s public comments suggest he sees value in patience. Defining the party’s candidate first, consolidating internal support, and then exploring coalition options may reduce risks, but it also carries the danger of isolation if other opposition forces move ahead without the Democratic Center.

Lessons from the region: the case of Chile

The debate within Colombia’s right does not occur in a vacuum. Across Latin America, conservative and right-leaning movements are reassessing their strategies after mixed electoral outcomes. Chile offers a particularly revealing comparison following the victory of Jose Antonio Kast. There, the right managed to rally behind a clear alternative with a strong message centered on security, governance, and institutional order — themes that resonated with a broad segment of voters.

Beyond the electoral result itself, the Chilean process left several strategic lessons that are highly relevant for conservative and center-right forces across the region. Kast managed to capitalize on institutional fatigue and rising concerns over public security with a coherent, direct, and consistent message, avoiding programmatic ambiguity. His campaign relied on a clear narrative focused on order, economic stability, and the strengthening of the rule of law — issues that resonated with an electorate weary of political uncertainty.

Another key factor was the ability to consolidate support in the later stage of the race. While the right-wing vote in Chile was not fully unified in the first round, the sector managed to close ranks once the contest became polarized. That capacity to regroup quickly allowed conservative, liberal, and parts of the center to ultimately back a single candidacy, prioritizing electoral viability over secondary ideological differences.

For the region, the message is clear: The right can be competitive when it succeeds in combining ideological identity with electoral pragmatism. Chile showed that total homogeneity among allies is not essential, but a basic agreement on priorities and leadership is. In contrast to more fragmented scenarios — where internal disputes dilute the opposition vote — the Chilean case reinforces the idea that unity, even if achieved late, can be decisive.

In the Colombian context, this example carries particular weight. The Chilean experience suggests that insisting on unity mechanisms that lack real backing can be counterproductive, but it also warns of the costs of failing to build bridges in time. For the regional right, Chile does not represent an exact model to replicate, but rather a clear signal: The absence of strategic coordination tends to benefit the ruling coalition, while convergence around clear leadership can redefine the political landscape.

For Colombia’s right, the message is sobering. Without a credible mechanism for unity — whether through consultations, polling agreements, or negotiated coalitions — the opposition risks repeating past mistakes. The challenge is not ideological alignment alone, but strategic coordination.

This contrast raises critical questions about the message being sent to the region. If one interpretation of Chile’s results is that coherent platforms with clear messaging can prevail, the Colombian situation suggests the opposite: That strategic coherence and organizational unity are still major hurdles for right-leaning blocs in a multiparty democratic landscape.

The risks of internal division

Internal divisions have historically exacted a high political cost, and the Democratic Center is not immune. Competing personal ambitions, differing views on alliances, and contrasting electoral strategies all create friction. If unresolved, these tensions could weaken the party’s performance not only in the presidential race but also in congressional elections.

Uribe’s public warnings about dispersion reflect an understanding of this risk. A divided right benefits the governing coalition by default, especially if left-leaning forces manage to remain relatively cohesive. Even a strong individual candidate may struggle if the broader political environment is fractured.

At the same time, avoiding consultations altogether carries its own dangers. Other opposition candidates may frame the Democratic Center as unwilling to compete openly or to seek consensus. Managing that narrative will be as important as the strategic decisions themselves.

A defining moment for the Democratic Center in Colombia

As the Democratic Center prepares to unveil its presidential candidate, the party stands at a crossroads. The announcement will mark the end of one internal process but the beginning of a far more complex negotiation with the broader opposition landscape. Alvaro Uribe’s public reflections reveal a leader grappling with the limits of unity in a fragmented political system, while still insisting that unity remains the ultimate goal.

Whether through consultations, surveys, or later-stage alliances, the success of Colombia’s right in 2026 will depend on its ability to balance identity with cooperation. The choices made in the coming weeks will not only shape the Democratic Center’s future but also send a broader signal about the viability of conservative unity in Colombia and perhaps across the region.

Related: Paloma Valencia, Democratic Center’s 2026 Colombian Presidential Candidate.