Electoral transparency in Colombia has, for decades, been an issue shaped by historical tensions, territorial inequalities, and deep public distrust.
Although the country has maintained an institutional continuity that sets it apart in the region, its electoral processes have not been free from controversy, particularly regarding vote buying, a practice entrenched in multiple rural areas where poverty, clientelism, and traditional political networks have fostered an electoral culture vulnerable to cooptation.
In every election cycle, allegations of cash payments, the distribution of construction materials, food packages, or promises of employment reemerge as a constant that erodes the legitimacy of the results and weakens public confidence in the ballot box.
In this context of structural fragility, the debate over transparency has taken on new nuances in recent years. Beyond the traditional concern about the direct purchase of votes, Colombia’s president, Gustavo Petro, has introduced an additional element that, he warns, could represent a systemic risk to electoral integrity: The role of the company Thomas Greg & Sons in managing technological processes linked to elections and sensitive data.
At yesterday’s Thursday rally in Bogota’s Bolivar Square, called by the government itself to support the minimum wage increase, the president reiterated his warnings about the need to conduct a thorough audit of the company’s software and cautioned about potential risks of electoral manipulation, opening a new front in the debate that goes beyond traditional clientelist practices.
How transparent are Colombia’s elections?
Vote buying in Colombia is neither a marginal nor a recent phenomenon. Various academic reports and complaints by civil society organizations have documented how, particularly in remote regions, electoral competition has unfolded in environments where economic resources and local political machines largely determine voter behavior.
In municipalities with high levels of poverty and limited state presence, the distribution of money or goods in exchange for votes has become a normalized practice, often socially tolerated as a survival mechanism rather than viewed as a crime.
In this regard, a recent report by Colombian television alleged irregularities in the peace seats, created precisely to give a voice to victims of the internal armed conflict. The journalistic investigation claimed that those seats were being taken over by local political clans, especially in the Catatumbo region, one of the areas still most affected by violence.
The truth is that vote buying is intertwined with clientelist structures that have operated for decades and continue to operate in Colombia. Local leaders, council members, deputies, and members of Congress have built networks of political brokerage that connect public resources with electoral loyalties.
Although Colombian legislation provides for severe sanctions against electoral corruption — the Interior Ministry offers up to 50 million pesos (approximately US$13,500) as a reward for reporting these practices — evidentiary difficulties and institutional weakness in certain territories have prevented the eradication of these practices. The result is a persistent perception that, in certain places, the vote is not always fully free.
Despite these challenges, Colombia’s electoral system has been recognized for having technical and logistical mechanisms that, in general terms, have allowed for political alternation and results accepted by the main players. The organization of elections, the presence of polling jurors, party witnesses, and national and international observers have helped sustain a formal architecture of guarantees.
The debate over electoral technology and Thomas Greg & Sons
In recent years, the debate has partially shifted to the technological sphere. President Gustavo Petro has repeatedly stated that control over software and digital platforms used in strategic state processes represents a critical point for democracy.
His concern has focused on Thomas Greg & Sons, a private company with a long track record in the production of security documents, and which for years was linked to the issuance of passports in Colombia, a contract that was not renewed last year by decision of the government.
According to the president, the concentration of sensitive information and the development of software related to electoral processes in the hands of a private company with alleged ties to traditional political sectors could entail risks of manipulation or interference.
In his remarks yesterday, Thursday, before supporters in Bolivar Square, the head of state called for a deep and independent audit of the company’s software and warned of potential vulnerabilities in the handling of electoral data. Although he did not present concrete evidence of fraud, his statements pointed to the need to thoroughly review any technological component involved in organizing elections.
“Thomas Greg cannot manage electoral computing software when at the same time it manages Colombians’ data through its involvement in ID issuance authorized by the Registry Office, and in passports, which they still want to hand over to them, and for which it still maintains the database,” he wrote on X.
“Specifically, a private company knows by name who is abroad, and if they are also given the computing software, they could make them vote without their consent, simply by entering their name and ID number into the form,” the president wrote on his X social media account regarding his allegations of supposed electoral irregularities that he has long linked to this company.
No deben dejarse casilleros en blanco en los formularios, el software de Thomas and Gregg debe ser auditado por expertos a profundidad, el software de Indra ya es un resumen.
No puede Thomas and Greg manejar software de cómputo electoral cuando al mismo tiempo maneja los datos… https://t.co/Zj8wal9cUG
— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) February 19, 2026
Thomas Greg & Sons and the shadow of electoral manipulation
Thomas Greg & Sons has, on various occasions, rejected insinuations of irregularities and has defended the legality of its operations. The company has underscored its experience and its historic role in providing high-security services to the Colombian state.
Nevertheless, the presidential accusation has amplified public scrutiny over technology contracts and has shifted into the civic debate, questions that previously circulated mainly in technical and legal spheres.
The president’s statements, delivered in a public square before thousands of supporters, carry a political impact that goes beyond technical matters. When the head of state suggests potential risks to the integrity of software linked to electoral processes, the warning takes on a powerful symbolic dimension.
The transparency of the vote is not merely an administrative matter; it is one of the fundamental pillars of any democracy. The mere suspicion that this pillar may be compromised casts a shadow of doubt that can erode public trust, even if irregularities are later not confirmed.
In a country where the memory of fraud, clientelism, and political violence still weighs on the collective culture, the debate over electoral technology overlaps with old wounds.
On the one hand, there is a legitimate demand for greater oversight, independent audits, and maximum transparency in the use of software and databases. Also, there is the risk that political discourse, if not backed by solid evidence, may contribute to weakening institutional credibility.
Election Observation Mission criticizes President Petro’s ‘narrative’
Following the president’s controversial statements yesterday regarding possible manipulation of ballots in the legislative elections scheduled for March 8, Alejandra Barrios, director of the Election Observation Mission (MOE), expressed concern over what she described as a “narrative” aimed at calling into question the legitimacy of the electoral results.
Barrios stated that there is no risk of fraud in the system used to transmit and consolidate data and that what exists are alerts about vote-buying and logistical difficulties, firmly rebutting Petro’s remarks.
MOE’s concern is based — precisely — on the president’s statements about potential vulnerabilities in the results transmission software and has insisted that no blank spaces should be left on the forms.
“No, that risk of fraud does not exist. There may be risks that problems could arise, but a risk regarding the way the electoral process is carried out, the data are transmitted, and the information is consolidated — that type of risk does not exist in the country at this time,” the MOE spokesperson told local outlet Blu Radio.
Finally, Barrios recalled that “the National Civil Registry is an autonomous, independent body, and it must remain so. It is the referee of the elections.”
The never-cleared shadow of electoral fraud
In Colombia, the shadow of alleged electoral fraud recurs cyclically. Beyond the affront to democracy represented by the National Front, a political agreement between the two major traditional parties of the time — Liberal and Conservative — to divide up the presidency and undermine elections between 1958 and 1974, systematically excluding any minority option and ultimately giving rise to the creation of communist guerrilla groups in the 1960s, full public trust in the rules of the game has not been a historical constant.
Nevertheless, Colombia’s electoral architecture includes institutions such as the National Civil Registry and the National Electoral Council, responsible for organizing and overseeing elections. In technical terms, the processes have gained in modernization and coverage.
However, practices such as vote buying, pressure from regional political machines, and disinformation continue to erode the perception of electoral integrity, especially in rural and remote areas.
This reality is known, repeated, permitted, and even exploited by much of Colombia’s political class. That is why it remains unchanged. Now, the accusations of technological manipulation put forward by Petro add a highly troubling element that the country would do well to clarify as soon as possible.
Democratic quality is not measured solely by the periodic holding of elections, but by fairness in competition, the independence of electoral authorities, and trust in the results. In this sense, Colombia faces a paradox: While its elections are often formally recognized, broad social sectors maintain deep-rooted distrust toward the political system. After Petro’s allegations, even more so.
Strengthening transparency implies not only technical reforms, but also political will to combat electoral corruption and reduce territorial inequality.
Colombian democracy is not in ruins, but neither can it be considered consolidated or complete. Its future legitimacy will depend on closing the gap between formal legality and effective public trust.
To achieve this, political consensus — as complex in times of polarization such as the present — is the main foundation upon which to build a complete democratic system that validates, in the eyes of citizens, nothing less than the legitimacy of their leaders.