The death of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as El Mencho, head of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), may have consequences that go far beyond Mexico, shaking the foundations of transnational crime, including Colombia.
The operation that killed him yesterday in a joint effort between Mexican and U.S. forces not only unleashed violence and uncertainty in that country but also raised questions about the effects this downfall will have on the drug trafficking networks operating between Mexico, Central America, and South America, especially in Colombia, one of the world’s leading cocaine producers.
The disappearance of one of the most powerful figures in organized crime now lays out a map of possible realignments, new alliances, and challenges for the criminal structures that have historically built ties with Mexican cartels to market their products in international markets.
In Bogota, in producing regions such as Cauca, and along the corridors connecting rural areas with ports and borders, the announcement of Mencho’s fall has been closely watched. The presence of CJNG in Colombia is well known to authorities: Local groups had established contacts with emissaries of the Mexican cartel for the purchase of cocaine, price-setting, and the opening of routes to the north.
Its withdrawal, fragmentation, or reconfiguration directly affects these groups’ negotiations with their buyers and alters the balance of power in a market that for years has been dominated by intercontinental agreements and tensions.
How would El Mencho’s death affect Colombia?
The CJNG’s influence transcended Mexican borders when it managed to consolidate itself as one of the main intermediaries in the chain linking coca crops in Colombia with consumer markets in North America, Europe, and Asia.
Under El Mencho’s leadership, this organization expanded its network of alliances, diversified illicit activities, and increased its capacity to violently pressure states and communities to secure its operations.
With his death, what remains is a power vacuum that does not necessarily translate into disappearance, but rather into a likely internal fragmentation of that cartel and a reconfiguration of alliances with other criminal groups.
This realignment has direct effects at the heart of the business: prices, routes, and the very structure of negotiation. Without a strong central figure to coordinate cocaine purchases or set stable conditions, Colombian criminal groups could experience greater volatility in their relationships with external buyers.
El Mencho’s absence may represent, according to a report published today by Colombian outlet El Tiempo, an opportunity for other rival Mexican organizations to seek to fill that gap, imposing their own conditions or alliances. Thus, the market does not calm down, but instead becomes more strained with new players interested in controlling strategic corridors.
Impact on producing regions and export routes
In regions such as the department of Cauca, where coca crops, illegal economies, and the presence of armed groups converge, the influence of CJNG emissaries had materialized in purchase agreements and shipment mobility. The Ombudsman’s Office had warned about that presence, and many local operators depended on those contacts to legitimize their businesses.
With the emergence of a power vacuum in Mexico, those same regions now face the possibility of having to renegotiate with new intermediaries or diversify their contacts with other cartels interested in those export routes.
The very routes connecting Colombian fields to the north are subject to new pressures. A shift in control of corridors could result in forced displacement, changes in the supply of cocaine in the international market, and a temporary increase in violence as different groups compete for those spaces.
It is a dynamic that, far from translating into calm, intensifies competition among criminal structures seeking to consolidate their presence and sustain their income in a complex global scenario.
El Mencho’s fall cannot be seen as an endpoint, but as a turning point. Colombian criminal organizations such as the FARC dissidents, ELN, or the major drug trafficking groups that have traditionally operated in the country are closely watching the evolution of CJNG.
The possible internal fragmentation of the Mexican cartel could open spaces to renegotiate conditions or establish new agreements with rival players, but it could also generate uncertainty and violence as those seeking to replace Mencho fight to consolidate their control.
Experts note that in the short term, cocaine prices could fluctuate and export routes could change hands, directly affecting the profit margins of Colombian groups. In the long term, this realignment of alliances and the possible emergence of new players in the equation could alter the map of organized crime in South America and Central America, influencing security and local economies.
Drug trafficking in transition and the focus on the 2026 World Cup
El Mencho’s disappearance marks a moment of transition for global drug trafficking. In Colombia, this resonates in an already complex context: criminal groups with decades of history, deeply entrenched illegal economies, and a state that has struggled to maintain territorial control.
The death of one of the continent’s most powerful kingpins does not simplify that landscape, but rather transforms it. The world of criminality associated with the lucrative drug trafficking business is not going to significantly reduce its activity, much less disappear, following yesterday’s military operation and the neutralization of the criminal who led what was until now the world’s most powerful cartel.
CJNG’s structure has sufficient mid-level leadership that is not only capable of provoking the chaos seen since yesterday in several regions of Mexico, which even affected Guadalajara’s airport, but is also sufficient to maintain its criminal activity directly related to drug trafficking.
In addition, another hypothesis being considered by authorities, and cited today by AFP, is that an alert remains in place over the possible entry of Colombians linked to criminal organizations who may seek to take advantage of international events such as the World Cup to enter the country.
In this regard, Roberto Alarcon, security coordinator for the state of Jalisco, Mexico, stated that “we have already returned to their country some Colombian citizens who could not prove the reason for their presence.”
Since the demobilization and disarmament of the FARC guerrilla in 2017 and the reduction of Colombia’s military budget, former guerrillas and former soldiers have been recruited by Mexican cartels, a phenomenon that is repeated in other countries affected by conflict.
Moreover, the city of Guadalajara, the capital of Jalisco, is preparing to receive thousands of foreign visitors during the World Cup tournament. To strengthen security, authorities will deploy more than 2,000 surveillance cameras, drones, anti-drone systems, and helicopters, amid fears of criminals infiltrating among fans.
What is at stake is how drug trafficking networks reconfigure themselves after El Mencho’s death, how Colombian groups negotiate their place in this new order, and to what extent states and societies can anticipate and mitigate the impact of this adjustment within organized crime.