In 2025, Colombia crossed an economic threshold it had avoided for decades: It recorded the largest trade deficit in its recent history. According to official figures from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), the gap between imports and exports reached a negative balance of US$16.37 billion.
This is not a minor or temporary figure. It reflects a structural shift in the country’s relationship with international trade, with implications ranging from economic growth to employment, exchange rates, and fiscal stability.
The trade balance — which for years relied heavily on hydrocarbons — now shows signs of vulnerability in the face of the global energy transition, industrial slowdown, and rising domestic consumption of imported goods.
Particularly striking is the imbalance with China: The bilateral deficit reached US$16.5 billion, while with the United States it was only US$344 million, meaning the deficit with the Asian giant was 48 times larger according to DANE.
What is happening is not simply that Colombia buys more than it sells. It signals a transformation — and fragility — in the country’s economic model.
A country that imports more and exports almost the same amount
DANE figures show a clear pattern: Colombian imports are growing strongly while exports remain stagnant.
For decades, Colombia compensated for its lack of productive diversification with oil, coal, and coffee. When international prices were favorable, the country managed to balance its external accounts. Today, that mechanism works increasingly poorly.
The Colombian economy mainly imports machinery, technological equipment, vehicles, chemical products, textiles, and manufactured goods largely from Asia.
Many of these products are no longer made locally or are produced at significantly higher costs. At the same time, exports remain concentrated in raw materials.
The country sells energy and basic goods; it buys technology and industrial products. This pattern is typical of primary export economies but becomes dangerous when global demand changes or energy prices fall.
In simple terms, Colombia consumes like an industrialized economy but produces like an extractive one. That creates a permanent imbalance.
China, the trading partner that widened the gap
The most revealing data in the report is the trade relationship with China. The bilateral deficit practically explains the entire Colombian external imbalance.
Colombia massively purchases Chinese-manufactured goods: cell phones, appliances, machinery, auto parts, clothing, and industrial equipment. In contrast, it mainly sells coal and oil, products with volatile prices and uncertain long-term demand.
This means the national economy depends on energy cycles to pay for everyday consumer goods. When oil does not compensate, the balance deteriorates quickly.
The problem is not trading with China — every country does — but the nature of the exchange. Colombia buys value-added goods and sells natural resources. It is a typical relationship between an industrial economy and an extractive one.
In other words, every time a Colombian buys an imported cellphone, the economy needs to export several barrels of oil to balance that transaction. If crude prices fall, the deficit automatically grows.
The warning from the financial sector
The deterioration raised alarms among economic analysts. On his X account, Cesar Pabon, executive director of Corficolombiana — a Colombian financial corporation and investment bank that finances infrastructure, energy, and business projects, and produces economic analysis and market research — wrote about the commercial imbalance.
“It is truly concerning that the trade deficit has reached its highest level in more than 50 years. Exports are stagnant and imports are growing at double-digit rates”. The statement, in simple terms, describes a key phenomenon: The country is spending abroad much faster than it generates international income.
If a family earns the same amount each month but increases credit card spending every year, it inevitably goes into debt. At a national scale, the same occurs: The trade deficit must be financed with external debt or foreign investment. That implies vulnerability. If foreign capital stops entering, the country needs to devalue its currency to rebalance the accounts, making life more expensive for citizens.
Pabón’s analysis points to the heart of the issue: The deficit is not a temporary accident but a structural imbalance between consumption and external income.
The government’s interpretation and the bet on migrant capital
Colombian President Gustavo Petro offered a different reading. On his X account, he stated that the drop in the deficit is more related to hydrocarbon exports to China and the world. He also made an unusual appeal; he urged Colombians living abroad to return and invest their savings in housing, infrastructure, or productive projects in the country.
Why would a president turn to migrants amid a trade deficit? Because the external deficit and the fiscal deficit are connected. When a country buys more than it sells, it needs dollars.
Those dollars can come from experts, foreign investment, external borrowing, remittances, or private savings entering the country. The presidential proposal seeks to increase the last source. If Colombians abroad bring capital, the country obtains foreign currency without going into debt.
At its core, the message implies recognition that the country needs financing to sustain spending and growth while restructuring its productive system.
The deep causes of the trade deficit
The deficit did not appear suddenly. It accumulated over the years due to a combination of structural factors.
First, productive reprimarization, which basically means when the country’s economy shifts back toward dependence on raw materials and natural resources such as oil, coal, or agriculture, instead of manufacturing and industry.
In Colombia’s case, during the oil boom of the past decade, manufacturing lost competitiveness against cheap imports. Many factories closed or reduced production.
Second, historical currency appreciation. When oil was expensive, so many dollars entered that the peso strengthened. That made imports cheaper and industrial exports more expensive.
Third, the global energy transition. Future demand for coal and oil is uncertain. The world still buys them, but they no longer guarantee sustained growth.
Fourth, rising domestic consumption. Credit expansion and urbanization increased demand for imported durable goods.
Fifth, low export sophistication. Colombia exports few technological, pharmaceutical, or industrial goods. The country does not compete in global value chains and therefore depends on commodities. The result is an economy that imports innovation and exports nature.
Impacts on the economy: where the blow will be felt
The trade deficit is not just a technical indicator. It translates into concrete effects on daily life.
First, pressure on the dollar. When more foreign currency leaves than enters, the currency tends to depreciate. That makes imported food, refined fuels, medicines, and technology more expensive.
Second, structural inflation. A weak currency makes productive inputs more expensive. Companies pass costs to consumers.
Third, slower growth. If the country must devote more resources to paying imports or external debt, less capital remains for domestic investment.
Fourth, fiscal deterioration. A high trade deficit reduces revenue linked to the export sector and increases dependence on external financing, just as Colombia already faces a complex fiscal adjustment.
Fifth, limited industrial employment. By importing manufactures instead of producing them, the country loses the capacity to generate skilled jobs.
Pressure on the dollar will likely be the first visible symptom for households. A persistent external deficit implies a permanent demand for foreign currency to pay for imports, keeping the exchange rate structurally high even during international stability.
In Colombia, this translates into gradual but continuous increases in the cost of living: from livestock feed — which ends up affecting meat and dairy prices — to medical equipment, fertilizers, and transportation.
Devaluation also fuels imported inflation that is difficult to control with traditional monetary policy, because it does not stem from excess domestic demand but from external productive dependence. In this scenario, the country faces the risk of moderate chronic inflation: Not hyperinflation, but a persistently high price level that erodes real income and reduces consumption.
That generalized increase in costs ultimately affects economic growth. When households devote more income to basic imported goods, they consume fewer local services, and when firms pay more for foreign inputs, they invest less.
The result is lower potential growth for several years. At the same time, fiscal deterioration worsens, lower profits in the export sector reduce tax revenue, while the state must spend more to offset the social impact of higher living costs.
This pressures public debt and may force new budget adjustments. In parallel, industrial employment weakens as the economy continues replacing domestic production with imports, consolidating a labor market concentrated in low-productivity commerce and services.
The scenario Colombia faces is not a sudden crisis but something more complex: A prolonged cycle of slow growth, fiscal pressure, and external dependence that limits the country’s ability to improve real incomes in the medium term.
Between the fiscal deficit and the trade deficit: a double pressure
Colombia simultaneously faces two imbalances: It spends more than it collects and buys more than it sells. When both occur at the same time, the country depends on international confidence. If investors perceive risk, interest rates rise, and external credit becomes more expensive.
The problem is not only the size of the current deficit but its persistence. An occasional deficit can finance development; a structural one can slow the economy. In this scenario, government proposals seek to buy time while the productive system transforms.
However, transformation requires decades of industrial policy, technological innovation, and specialized education.
The deeper challenge: changing the economic model
The record trade deficit reveals a reality: Colombia has not diversified its economy at the pace of globalization. While Asia exports manufactures and technological services, the country continues relying on natural resources. When energy prices fail to compensate, the economy becomes exposed.
The underlying debate is not only commercial. It is productive. Should Colombia protect the domestic industry? Invest aggressively in technology? Bet on exportable renewable energy? Reindustrialize strategic sectors? The answers will determine whether the 2025 deficit is a historical anomaly or the start of a permanent trend.
An indicator that goes beyond the balance
The record trade deficit does not mean the economy is collapsing today. It means the current model has limits. For years, growth relied on raw materials, imported consumption, and capital inflows. That balance worked while the world demanded fossil energy on a large scale.
Now the global context is changing. The deficit is an early signal that the country needs to produce more value added than it consumes. Otherwise, it will increasingly depend on external financing to sustain its standard of living.
More than a historic figure, it is an economic message. Colombia must decide whether it remains an exporter of resources or becomes a producer of industry. The size of the deficit suggests that decision can no longer be postponed.