For more than a decade, the expansion of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) was built on a single principle: absolute vertical command, paramilitary discipline, and strategic centralization. Unlike historic Mexican drug trafficking organizations that evolved into federations of autonomous cells, CJNG grew as a hierarchical criminal enterprise, with operational doctrine defined from the top. Who will replace El Mencho, the dead leader of that organization?
That is why the killing of its leader would not be merely symbolic. It would represent a structural shock.
El Mencho was not only the founder, but he was also the internal arbiter, the architect of routes, the guarantor of alliances, and the final authority over violence. Without him, the cartel will face its greatest organizational test.
The question is not whether the organization will survive. The question is what it will become.
Criminal intelligence assessments already outline potential successors. None perfectly replicates the leader’s profile; some hold family legitimacy, others territorial control, others tactical command, or financial networks. The future of CJNG will depend on which of those legitimacies prevails or whether none manages to impose itself.
Juan Carlos Valencia Gonzalez: the blood heir and dynastic logic
Within the internal structure, the figure with the strongest succession narrative is known as “El 03” or “El Plumas.” He belongs not only to the inner circle but is also the stepson of the leader and the son of Rosalinda Gonzalez Valencia, long considered the financial administrator of the clan.
In modern cartels, kinship does not always guarantee power, but it does provide symbolic legitimacy. And in highly personalist organizations, that legitimacy matters.
“El 03” has been characterized by a tactical rather than political profile. His rise inside the cartel is tied to directing armed operations, particularly shock deployments against rival forces and the coordination of CJNG elite groups. Intelligence sources describe him as one of the most disciplined commanders in the cartel’s military logic: rapid mobility, simultaneous attacks, and systematic use of armed propaganda.
His influence has extended across strategic corridors in western Mexico, mainly in zones of confrontation with rival organizations. Unlike territorial bosses, his authority does not depend on a specific plaza but on his capacity to mobilize lethal force.
That detail is key; in the absence of the leader, a cartel needs someone who orders violence. And that profile fits him.
But his weakness is also his strength. He is a military operator, not a negotiator. His leadership could harden the cartel, increase confrontations, and reduce alliances. CJNG would shift from an expansionist enterprise to a permanent war organization.
Hugo Gonzalo Mendoza Gaytan: the recruitment strategist
If “El 03” represents inheritance, Hugo Gonzalo Gaytan, known as “El Sapo” (The Toad), represents administration.
For years, he has been identified as one of the managers of internal operations and, above all, of the cartel’s recruitment architecture. His role has been less publicly visible but essential for territorial expansion: training cadres, integrating local cells, and converting regional gangs into CJNG operational franchises.
His power lies in something El Mencho carefully built: the ability to grow without fragmenting.
“El Sapo” understands that organizational logic. He is a commander who does not necessarily direct battles but manages human structures. In the Bajio and central Mexico, his influence has been linked to absorbing smaller criminal groups under a single brand.
In succession terms, this gives him a quiet advantage: He controls the network, not the territory.
His leadership would imply a more corporate than military CJNG. Less spectacular open violence, but more stable economic operation. He would likely prioritize logistical continuity, local agreements, and gradual expansion rather than confrontations.
The cartel would not become less dangerous; it would become more institutional.
Audias Flores Silva: the territorial administrator
Audias Flores Silva, known as “El Jardinero,” has long been a key regional boss. His name is associated with the plaza control and management of local structures across different parts of the country. He is neither the shock commander nor the symbolic heir: He is the territory manager.
His influence lies in mediation. Wherever CJNG arrives, it must organize illegal economies: extortion, fuel theft, illegal mining, protection rackets. That process requires someone who negotiates with local players, from corrupt officials to armed community groups. That is where he operates.
In succession scenarios, figures such as Flores Silva often become “balancers.” They may not aspire to lead the entire organization, but they can tilt the balance by backing one candidate or another.
His real power would be deciding which plazas obey whom. If he assumed leadership, CJNG would tend toward a federated structure: semi-autonomous regions under weak central coordination. This would reduce internal wars in the short term but increase the probability of future fragmentation.
Ricardo Ruiz Velasco: Guadalajara’s urban power
Within the cartel, Guadalajara is more than a city; it is the origin, the historic base, and the logistical heart.
There operates Ricardo Ruiz Velasco, known as “El Doble R,” considered by many analysts the second most relevant figure in the organization in recent years.
His role has been managing urban infrastructure: internal security, local cell control, financial logistics, and operational coordination across the metropolitan area. While others control routes, he controls the nerve center.
That role makes his power structural. Without Guadalajara, CJNG loses cohesion. And whoever dominates the city dominates internal communication.
His leadership would imply continuity of the centralist model. Not through family inheritance or violence, but through organizational control. He would be the candidate of criminal bureaucracy: operators, accountants, coordinators.
His main advantage is that he can keep the organization unified. His main weakness: He lacks the founder’s intimidating charisma. In the criminal world, cohesion without fear is sometimes not enough.
Heraclio Guerrero: the national economic operator
Heraclio Guerrero, known as “El Tio Lako” represents another dimension of CJNG: economic diversification.
Unlike commanders focused on drug trafficking, his influence is linked to alternative revenue sources: illegal extraction, transport networks, regional underground economies, and commercial intermediation structures.
He has operated especially in strategic zones of Michoacan, where social control matters as much as territorial control.
His profile is less military and more political. He has served as a bridge between criminal structures and local economic actors, giving him indirect national reach. His leadership would change the nature of the cartel.
CJNG could transform from an expansionist trafficking organization into a diversified criminal conglomerate. Fewer spectacular wars, more silent penetration.
The impact of the capture: restructuring or fragmentation?
The history of Mexican drug trafficking suggests a pattern: When a centralist leader falls, the cartel does not disappear; it splits.
But CJNG presents an anomaly. While organizations such as older cartels operated as confederations, CJNG was designed as a vertical structure. That implies two opposing scenarios:
First, a rapid succession. One commander imposes himself within weeks, reduces internal disputes, and maintains cohesion. This would require strong legitimacy — probably familial or structural — and control of internal communications.
Second, an unstable balance. None fully dominates, and a de facto directorate emerges. The cartel keeps functioning, but with growing regional autonomy. This would be the beginning of gradual fragmentation.
The worst scenario would be an open internal war. Without a supreme arbiter, armed cells could compete for local rents, replicating what happened after the fall of earlier organizations.
Operational and power consequences
In the short term, the capture of the leader would not immediately weaken CJNG’s armed capacity. Routes, laboratories, and financial networks do not depend on a single person.
What would change is decision-making. El Mencho centralized strategic violence. Without him, violence could become erratic: more local confrontations, less national coordination.
For the state, this creates a paradox. A less centralized cartel can be more chaotic and more lethal locally. For the criminal market, the effect would be reconfiguration. Rival groups would attempt to reclaim territories. But agreements would also emerge: CJNG cells could negotiate independently. The cartel’s power would cease to be vertical and become territorial.
An uncertain future
Rather than collapse, the removal of El Mencho will open a process of internal redefinition. The cartel was built around a personal authority that resolved disputes, authorized expansion, and set limits on violence; without that arbitral figure, the organization must find a new principle of cohesion.
The outcome will depend on which type of legitimacy prevails: The dynastic one embodied by Juan Carlos Valencia Gonzalez, potentially hardening the military profile; the organizational legitimacy associated with operators like Ricardo Ruiz Velasco, favoring administrative continuity; the territorial legitimacy represented by regional bosses such as Audias Flores Silva, pushing toward plaza autonomy; or the financial legitimacy linked to broader economic structures like those of Heraclio Guerrero.
In practice, the cartel would not disappear, but it would cease behaving as a single command and transform — gradually or abruptly — into a network of negotiated powers. The real change would not be the loss of criminal capacity, but the loss of predictability: Less centralized strategy, more local decision-making, and therefore a landscape in which violence could become irregular, fragmented, and harder for authorities and rivals to anticipate.
For now, and as noted by the local newspaper La Vanguardia, Mexican and U.S. authorities believe the most likely short-term scenario is a period of instability while a new balance of power is defined. The organization still retains financial resources, weaponry, and international presence, so its weakening will not be immediate.