The comparison raised by Colombian economist Alberto Bernal on the program Velez por La Mañana (a digital newscast hosted by the renowned Colombian journalist Luis Carlos Velez) has sparked a debate that goes beyond electoral math and touches on deeper questions about the country’s political moment as it heads toward 2026 and allows for a comparison between the Colombia and Chile elections.
Bernal argues that, according to betting markets (particularly the platform Polymarket), Ivan Cepeda currently has roughly a 66% probability of winning the first round. From that starting point, he draws a parallel with Chile’s 2025 elections, in which then-candidate Jeannette Jara won 27% of the vote in the first round, followed by Jose Antonio Kast, with 24%, and Franco Parisi, with 19%.
The comparison raises a series of questions: Is it valid to extrapolate Chile’s electoral behavior to the Colombian case? What do the numbers actually reveal about the strength or fragility of political blocs? And what does this debate say about the current state of democracy and public opinion in Colombia?
The starting point: the numbers and their interpretation
Prediction markets such as Polymarket are not traditional opinion polls. They function as platforms where participants buy and sell contracts based on perceived probabilities. They reflect aggregated expectations, but they do not replace scientific polling nor guarantee accuracy.
Still, the fact that these markets assign Ivan Cepeda a high probability of winning the first round has drawn attention from analysts and political players. According to Bernal’s reading, if the election were held today, Cepeda would receive about 29% of the vote — a figure he compares to the 27% achieved by Jeannette Jara in Chile.
Yet the parallel has limits. Colombia’s political system is marked by strong party fragmentation, shifting coalitions, and an electorate historically inclined toward competitive runoff elections.
As highlighted by Bernal during the interview, in 2022, current President Gustavo Petro secured nearly 40% in the first round, an unusually high result in recent Colombian history and one that consolidated the perception of a cohesive progressive bloc at that moment.
Compared with that precedent, 29% for a left-wing candidate can be interpreted in two ways: As a solid base that ensures a place in the runoff, or as a sign of weakening compared with the performance of the Historic Pact in 2022.
Chile as a mirror: a useful analogy?
The comparison with Chile is suggestive but complex. In that country, the recent political cycle has been marked by social unrest, failed constitutional reform efforts, and growing ideological polarization. The 2025 result showed a fragmented map, with no force achieving a commanding hegemony in the first round.
In Colombia, although there are evident social and economic tensions such as persistent inflation, debates over structural reforms, and concerns about security, the institutional context and political history differ significantly. Colombia has not undergone a recent constitutional process of the same magnitude, nor does its party system operate under identical dynamics.
However, the analogy points to something more structural, such as the possibility that a candidate identified with the left could finish first in a fragmented race, yet with a vote share insufficient to guarantee final victory without broad alliances.
The right and the figure of Abelardo de La Espriella
In the scenario outlined by Bernal, attorney Abelardo de La Espriella would place second with about 23% of the vote — comparable to Jose Antonio Kast’s 24% in Chile. This hypothesis introduces another debate: the recomposition of Colombia’s right after its defeat in 2022.
Conservative and center-right sectors have focused their criticism of the Petro administration on economic management, security policy, and the implementation of structural reforms. Nevertheless, the opposition spectrum remains fragmented among traditional leaders, emerging figures, and independent aspirants.
Whether de La Espriella could consolidate himself as a competitive candidate depends not only on ideological positioning but also on his ability to gather support beyond his natural base. In a two-round system, success lies as much in mobilizing one’s own voters as in building bridges to the political center and independent sectors.
The political center and the dispersion of the vote
Bernal also mentions Sergio Fajardo, whom he slightly compares to Franco Parisi in Chile, though with a substantial difference; Fajardo appears in polls at around 7%, far below Parisi’s 19%.
This comparison underscores questions about the space for the political center in Colombia. In 2022, Fajardo failed to reach the runoff, illustrating the difficulty of competing in a polarized environment. If the center does not articulate a strong and cohesive candidacy, the result could once again reflect a contest dominated by opposing blocs.
Bernal also points to the potential candidacy of Roy Barreras, suggesting he could capture around 1.5 million votes. In a close race, that share could significantly reshape first-round percentages and alter perceptions of strength among leading contenders. If those votes disperse, the projected 29% for Cepeda could fall closer to 24%, according to Bernal’s own analysis.
A political pendulum in motion?
One of the central themes in Bernal’s argument is the idea of a “pendulum shift.” He suggests that if a left-wing candidate were to advance to the runoff with less than 30% of the first-round vote, markets might interpret that as a sign that the political cycle initiated in 2022 is losing momentum.
Conversely, if that candidate were to surpass 36%, he views it as a scenario that could raise concerns from the perspective of investor confidence and policy continuity.
The notion of a pendulum is not new in Latin America. Several countries have alternated between left- and right-leaning governments over the past two decades, in response to economic cycles, social demands, and political fatigue. Yet reducing electoral behavior to a simple pendular movement risks oversimplifying complex dynamics.
In Colombia, the 2022 vote was shaped by structural factors such as accumulated social discontent, large-scale protests in 2019 and 2021, and a regional climate favorable to progressive candidacies. Assessing whether that impulse persists or has eroded requires examining broader indicators such as presidential approval, security perceptions, economic performance, and institutional trust.
What does the current context in Colombia suggest?
As 2026 approaches, Colombia faces significant economic challenges: Moderate growth, fiscal pressures, debates over the sustainability of the health and pension systems, and ongoing security tensions in various regions of the country.
The Petro administration has promoted structural reforms that have generated support in some sectors and resistance in others. That balance will inevitably shape voters’ evaluation of continuity versus change.
In this context, 29% for a left-wing candidate may represent a meaningful floor, but not necessarily an immovable ceiling. Likewise, 23% for a right-leaning aspirant suggests competitiveness, yet does not guarantee the ability to assemble a broad governing majority without alliances.
Between markets, polls, and ballots, Colombia’s electoral path may still be uncertain
The reference to Polymarket introduces another analytical layer: To what extent do prediction markets capture the true mood of the electorate? Some international studies suggest they can anticipate trends, but they are also exposed to participation biases and volatility.
Traditional polls, for their part, face their own challenges of representativeness and credibility. In Colombia, distrust of polling has grown following discrepancies between surveys and final outcomes in previous elections.
For that reason, rather than treating isolated figures as definitive forecasts, the debate may be better framed around structural trends: Is one bloc consolidating dominance? Is fragmentation deepening? Are unexpected alliances emerging that could reshape the board?
In the end, the debate does not conclude with percentages or international parallels. Instead, it opens a series of questions that could shape Colombia’s public conversation in the months ahead:
Is Colombia truly facing a repetition of Chile’s scenario, or do institutional and historical differences make that comparison misleading?
Do platforms like Polymarket reflect the deeper sentiment of Colombian voters, or do they amplify perceptions that could shift rapidly as the campaign unfolds?
If a candidate such as Ivan Cepeda were to reach the first round with less than 30%, would that signal erosion of the progressive project launched in 2022, or a sufficient base from which to build broader alliances?
Will right-leaning sectors manage to unify around a figure such as Abelardo de La Espriella, or will fragmentation continue to hinder the construction of majorities?
What role will figures like Sergio Fajardo or Roy Barreras play in redistributing votes and shaping potential second-round coalitions? To what extent will the performance of the current government on economic management and security decisively influence voter sentiment?
Are we witnessing a potential “pendulum shift” in Colombian politics, or rather a transition toward an even more fragmented and competitive system?
And ultimately, what kind of mandate will voters deliver in 2026, one of continuity, correction, or rupture, and how will that message redefine Colombia’s political map over the next decade?
These open questions reflect the complexity of a country entering a pre-electoral year with accumulated tensions, competing expectations, and a political landscape still in formation. Rather than confirming automatic parallels with Chile, the moment calls for a careful examination of Colombia’s own particularities and a recognition that in democratic politics, outcomes are rarely written in advance.