The promise of stopping ELN’s cocaine trafficking at its source has long been one of the most persistent pillars of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.
Yet along the Colombia–Venezuela border, that objective faces an increasingly complex obstacle posed by the strengthening of the National Liberation Army (ELN). What was once an insurgent guerrilla group has now evolved into a transnational criminal network deeply embedded in illegal economies, with territorial control and an operational structure that challenges both governments and international strategies.
In this context, the challenge is not only military or law enforcement–based, but structural, involving decades of state neglect, entrenched illicit economies, and a web of players that have enabled the group to evolve and consolidate itself as a key node in the region’s drug trafficking landscape.
From insurgency to a powerful cross-border criminal network
A recent report by The Wall Street Journal — titled “This Violent Gang Runs the Venezuela Cocaine Trade That Trump Vowed to End” — offers a compelling snapshot of how this organization has not only survived but transformed into a central player in the regional cocaine trade.
“Founded as an anti-government guerrilla group six decades ago, ELN is now a transnational criminal organization,” the report states, capturing the strategic shift of a group that has adapted to the changing dynamics of armed conflict and the opportunities presented by global organized crime.
This transformation cannot be understood without the context left behind by the 2016 peace agreement with the now-extinct FARC guerrilla group. As that dominant armed player withdrew from vast coca-growing territories, ELN quickly moved in to fill the void. Today, its presence is not only broader but more sophisticated.
According to the report, the organization has significantly increased its number of fighters and established a binational base, with a notable proportion of Venezuelan members. This factor is critical, as it reflects a structure that no longer operates strictly within national boundaries, but rather within cross-border dynamics that complicate traditional state control efforts.
The core of the problem lies in regions such as Catatumbo, one of the region’s most historically affected by conflict and institutional neglect. There, the absence of the state has allowed the ELN to take on roles that go far beyond armed activity. In many municipalities, the group regulates daily life, imposes social rules, and controls economic activities, effectively becoming a de facto authority. The report describes how curfews are imposed as early as 6 p.m., along with movement restrictions that reflect deep territorial dominance.
The construction of this “parallel state” is not symbolic, but functional. According to the article, “in these areas, neither the Colombian nor Venezuelan governments exercise power; instead, a criminal gang acts as a de facto state.” This reality not only highlights institutional weakness but also explains why ELN has been able to establish a complex, often ambivalent relationship with local communities, many of which depend economically on the activities the group oversees.
The invisible routes that sustain a billion-dollar cocaine flow
Control of coca is at the center of this system. The Catatumbo region accounts for a significant portion of Colombia’s coca leaf cultivation, and its strategic location enables direct access to Venezuela, which serves as a launch platform to international markets. At this stage, ELN has managed to integrate multiple layers of the business: It oversees cultivation, regulates processing, and controls transportation routes, creating a highly efficient and resilient supply chain.
Although there is no precise public figure on how much cocaine crosses the Colombia–Venezuela border daily, estimates from the U.S. Department of State help illustrate the scale of the phenomenon. According to that agency, between 200 and 250 metric tons of cocaine transit through Venezuela each year, equivalent to an approximate average of 548 to 685 kilograms per day.
While this flow is not uniform and does not occur, players such as ELN play a decisive role in regulating and controlling trafficking routes.
This dynamic is reinforced by the existence of more than a hundred illegal crossings, known as trochas, which function as clandestine corridors for the movement of drugs, weapons, and people. These routes allow traffickers to bypass state controls and maintain a steady flow of illicit goods, consolidating a system that operates outside the law but with a highly organized internal logic.
In this framework, ELN does not merely participate in the trade — it regulates it, imposing fees, conditions, and restrictions on other criminal players.
The report by The Wall Street Journal also highlights the group’s adaptability, noting how it has incorporated new technologies and tactics to strengthen its position. The use of drones in operations, their mobility in hard-to-reach terrain, and the diversification of illicit activities all point to a dynamic organization that has evolved in response to external pressure and shifting criminal landscapes.
However, ELN’s expansion cannot be understood without examining the networks of complicity that have facilitated its growth. In Venezuelan territory, the group has found favorable conditions to operate, including institutional tolerance and, according to analysts cited in the report, informal arrangements that allow it to maintain a presence in strategic areas in exchange for territorial control functions.
Institutional weakness and corruption have been decisive factors in this process. The lack of effective border control, combined with the economic incentives of drug trafficking and illegal mining, has created an environment where multiple actors benefit from the continuation of these activities.
ELN has capitalized on these conditions to build alliances, expand its influence, and diversify its income streams, including gold mining operations in Venezuela, further strengthening its financial and operational capacity.
A strategy facing limits in a conflict without clear boundaries
For the Trump administration, this scenario represents a particularly complex challenge. Traditional anti-narcotics strategies — focused on interdiction, eradication, and military pressure — fall short when confronting a hybrid structure such as ELN, which blends elements of insurgency, organized crime, and territorial governance.
Moreover, any attempt at direct intervention carries significant risks. Former Colombian Defense Minister Gabriel Silva warned that such an operation could “turn into a small Vietnam,” underscoring the operational difficulties of engaging in a geographically hostile and socially complex environment.
Another key factor is the relative legitimacy ELN has managed to build in some communities. While its presence is marked by coercion, it also responds to economic needs in areas where the state has failed to provide sustainable alternatives. This combination of control and dependency complicates any strategy based solely on force, as the issue is not just the existence of the group but also the conditions that allow it to persist.
More broadly, the ELN case reflects a deeper transformation of organized crime in Latin America. These organizations no longer operate merely as clandestine networks but as structures that exercise governance over specific territories. This shift requires a rethinking of traditional strategies, incorporating approaches that address structural drivers such as poverty, exclusion, and institutional weakness.
Furthermore, the consolidation of ELN along the Colombia–Venezuela border has direct implications for regional stability. The interconnection between drug trafficking, illegal mining, and corruption creates an ecosystem in which illicit economies reinforce one another, undermining state authority and perpetuating cycles of violence and illegality.
The report also suggests that ELN has embedded itself within global drug trafficking dynamics, establishing links with international networks that expand its reach. This makes the organization not just a local or regional player, but part of a broader transnational system where routes, markets, and alliances extend far beyond national borders.
In this context, a critical question emerges: Are current strategies sufficient to address a phenomenon of this scale? The experience in regions such as Catatumbo suggests that any approach that ignores structural conditions is likely to face significant limitations. The fight against drug trafficking cannot be reduced to military operations alone, but must include comprehensive interventions that tackle the root causes of the problem.
Ultimately, ELN represents not only an obstacle to U.S. anti-drug policy but also a symptom of deeper structural failures in the region. Its ability to adapt, expand, and entrench itself in areas of weak governance makes it a particularly resilient player.
As long as these underlying conditions persist, cocaine flows will continue to find alternative routes, and groups such as ELN will remain central players in the global drug trade. The challenge, therefore, is not only to dismantle an armed group, but to transform the conditions that made it possible. And that, perhaps, is the most complex task of all.