Colombia is once again confronting one of the most complex and sensitive episodes of its recent history: the so-called false positives. As the process continues to evolve with new figures, testimonies, and investigative lines, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) has asked former presidents Alvaro Uribe Vélez and Juan Manuel Santos to voluntarily appear and provide their accounts of these events.
Far from constituting an accusation or direct allegation, the request falls within the spirit of transitional justice: To listen, contrast narratives, and move forward in reconstructing a truth that remains unfinished for the country.
This step comes at a pivotal moment. JEP has expanded the timeframe of its analysis, moving from a focus on 2002–2008 — when the phenomenon reached its peak — to a much broader period from 1990 to 2016. This is not merely a technical adjustment.
It reshapes the scale of the phenomenon, expands the universe of cases, and compels a deeper understanding of these practices as part of a longer, more structural dynamic within Colombia’s armed conflict.
In that context, the perspectives of those who held the highest levels of power become particularly relevant — not to assign responsibility in advance, but to understand decisions, institutional dynamics, and the environment in which they were made.
A wound rooted in the logic of war
“False positives” became a painful term that captures a deeply disturbing practice: Civilians killed by members of the armed forces and later presented as guerrillas killed in combat. This phenomenon unfolded within Colombia’s decades-long internal conflict, especially during periods of heightened pressure to demonstrate results against insurgent groups such as FARC.
For years, the success of certain military units was measured by the number of enemy casualties reported. What appeared to be a technical metric ultimately led to severe distortions. Multiple investigations have pointed to the emergence of perverse incentives that, in some cases, pushed members of the armed forces toward illegal practices.
Young men — often from vulnerable communities — were lured with false job offers, transported to remote areas, killed, and then reported as enemy combatants.
The country became fully aware of the scale of the phenomenon in 2008, when cases from Soacha (a municipality located southwest of Bogota) exposed a systematic pattern. Families searching for missing relatives found them dead in distant regions, dressed as guerrillas. That moment marked a turning point, forcing Colombia to acknowledge that these were not isolated incidents but part of a much deeper problem.
A growing figure shaped by multiple sources
In 2021, JEP shook the country by establishing that at least 6,402 people had been victims of these killings between 2002 and 2008. Even then, the tribunal emphasized that the figure was provisional and subject to revision as new evidence emerged.
That revision has now taken place. After expanding the timeframe and cross-referencing multiple databases — including victim reports and institutional records — the number has risen to 7,837 victims according to JEP. This increase does not necessarily mean new crimes have been uncovered, but rather reflects a broader, more rigorous, and more complete understanding of the phenomenon.
In an interview with RTVC, the president of JEP, Alejandro Ramelli Arteaga, explained: “We have always said that these figures are provisional. … Now we are taking into account the period from 1990 to 2016, so the universe is much broader.” He added, “The second explanation is that we have cross-referenced more sources. … We are now working with much more information and have been able to contrast it more thoroughly.”
However, JEP is not the only institution that has documented these crimes. Long before these consolidated figures emerged, various organizations had already warned about the scale of the phenomenon from different angles. The Truth Commission incorporated the 6,402-victim figure into its database, the result of joint work with JEP and the Human Rights Data Analysis Group, which allowed for the cross-referencing of multiple datasets.
Meanwhile, Colombia’s National Center for Historical Memory contributed by identifying patterns — territories, timelines, and victimization dynamics — while organizations such as Human Rights Watch documented thousands of cases investigated by the Prosecutor’s Office and highlighted the role of institutional incentives.
Groups such as CINEP and the Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination also recorded cases dating back decades, showing that reports of extrajudicial killings long predate the transitional justice framework.
At the time, and before JEP, the Prosecutor’s Office was even the main judicial source. The institution presented to JEP a database of 2,248 victims covering the period between 1988 and 2014. A database that is important to highlight was built from cases that had been formally prosecuted or were under investigation, rather than from statistical estimates.
So, rather than contradicting one another, these figures reflect different methodologies. Some rely on judicial cases, others on victim reports, and others on large-scale statistical reconstructions. Taken together, they reveal a shift in understanding: From isolated incidents to a systemic pattern deeply embedded in the logic of war.
Former president and former minister of defense Juan Manuel Santos, at the center of a decisive moment
Within this broader reconstruction, Juan Manuel Santos emerges as a particularly relevant figure. He became Minister of Defense in 2006 during Alvaro Uribe’s re-election, at a time when Colombia’s security strategy was at its most intense.
His tenure coincided with major military operations such as Operation Phoenix — which resulted in the death of FARC leader Raul Reyes — and Operation Jaque, which rescued 15 hostages, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. These operations were widely seen as turning points in the conflict.
Yet that same period also corresponds to the peak of the false positives phenomenon. JEP has identified 2007 as the year with the highest number of cases, a conclusion supported by multiple independent sources. This places Santos in a central position for understanding what happened during that critical period — not as an exercise in blame, but as a key figure in reconstructing the historical record.
Santos himself has acknowledged the impact of these events. In a 2018 interview with Noticias Caracol, he stated, “It hurt me deeply to discover this (the false positives), and that is why we ended it immediately. … We began to prioritize demobilizations, then captures, and only as a last resort, deaths.”
Truth, acknowledgment, and the weight of apology
Santos’s role in the search for truth did not begin with the current process. In 2021, he appeared before the Truth Commission, where he provided his account as part of its “Contributions to the Truth” initiative. His testimony became a significant moment in Colombia’s effort to confront its past.
From the start, he explained his motivation: “I made this decision some time ago. I said I wanted to contribute this truth. … I believe the country must know this truth, and I do so with enthusiasm because I know that truth is the foundation of the reconciliation we all seek.”
He also described his initial reaction to early reports: “At first, they were nothing more than rumors without evidence, and I did not find them credible. I could not conceive that something like this could be happening. … By early 2007, I began receiving reports from credible sources. That’s when we started taking action against the false positives.”
In his analysis, Santos also pointed to a structural cause: “I have no doubt that the original sin … was the pressure to produce body counts and everything that was built around what many have called the Vietnam doctrine.” At the same time, he added a key clarification regarding Uribe: “In fairness, I must say that President Uribe did not oppose the change to this harmful doctrine. … I never received a counterorder or was overruled.”
Perhaps the most powerful moment came at the end of his testimony, when he acknowledged moral responsibility and asked for forgiveness: “I am left with deep remorse and sorrow that during my time as minister, many, many mothers … lost their sons to this cruel practice. … This should never have happened. I acknowledge it and ask forgiveness from all the mothers and their families, victims of this horror, from the bottom of my heart.”
His acknowledgment does not resolve the debate, but it represents a significant step in the transition from denial to recognition — at least on a moral level.
Uribe, government decisions, and competing narratives
For his part, Alvaro Uribe has maintained a critical stance toward JEP’s findings, arguing that they may be biased. In an interview with La FM (which took place in 2021), he emphasized the need for objectivity: “I must overcome any political bias.”
Uribe also described decisions made during his administration after receiving internal reports: “I said, with this report from you, I will take the decision to dismiss twenty-seven members of the armed forces.” At the same time, he avoided direct accusations against Santos: “I could not, out of political bias, stand here and make accusations against President Santos as Minister of Defense. … I would lose the moral authority to defend the results of my administration.”
These statements reflect the complexity of the issue and the need to approach it in a way that prioritizes truth over political confrontation. JEP’s request also responds to more than 300 petitions from organizations and victims seeking to expand the evidentiary record. In this context, hearing from former presidents is not about prejudging them, but about adding pieces to a still incomplete puzzle.
Current President Gustavo Petro recently described these acts as “the worst crime against humanity committed in the Americas in this century,” highlighting the symbolic and political weight of the issue. Yet beyond political positions, Colombia’s challenge remains the same: To move toward a fuller truth without becoming trapped in polarization. The JEP’s invitation opens a different path, one centered on listening, comparing accounts, and deepening collective memory.
Because, ultimately, the question is not only what happened, but what the country chooses to do with that truth. And in that answer lies the possibility of ensuring that crimes like the false positives are never repeated.
As this path continues to unfold, JEP’s road map is not limited to assigning responsibility but to reconstructing the full architecture of the phenomenon to reach a truth that truly brings justice and healing to the victims of this painful chapter in Colombia’s history.