Security has returned to the forefront of the presidential campaign in Colombia. In a country marked for decades by armed conflict, drug trafficking, and the expansion of criminal organizations, the debate over how to regain territorial control has once again become one of the electorate’s main concerns.
The Total Peace policy promoted by President Gustavo Petro, based on simultaneous negotiations with different armed groups, redefined the political landscape and opened a deep discussion about the limits between dialogue and state authority.
In the 2026 elections, the three candidates with the strongest chances of reaching the presidency are proposing completely different visions regarding the security problem. Ivan Cepeda — the ruling party candidate — proposes maintaining a strategy based on negotiations and social reforms; Abelardo De la Espriella — a right-wing populist — is betting on a shock policy inspired by hardline models; and Paloma Valencia — the uribista candidate — seeks to restore the democratic security approach of uribismo, although with a technological and institutional strengthening component.
Beyond the speeches, the debate revolves around a concrete question: how to turn those promises into real results in a country where violence continues to grow in several regions.
Where Do Colombia’s leading Presidential candidates stand on security?
Left-wing continuity candidate Ivan Cepeda defends the idea that security cannot depend exclusively on military operations. His campaign insists on the concept of “human security,” a formula that combines state presence, social investment, access to land, and negotiation with illegal armed groups. Cepeda proposes deepening the Total Peace policy promoted by Gustavo Petro, which after almost four years has failed to deliver the promised results. In this regard, Cepeda promises to correct implementation mistakes and toughen the conditions for keeping talks open.
Among his concrete proposals is strengthening financial intelligence to target illegal economies, especially drug trafficking and illegal mining. He also proposes increasing the state’s presence in historically neglected regions through investment in infrastructure, education, and healthcare, under the idea that institutional absence fuels armed recruitment.
However, the main criticism directed at Cepeda is precisely the effectiveness of that model. Opposition sectors argue that several armed groups took advantage of ceasefires to expand territorially and strengthen their finances. The National Liberation Army (ELN), dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and structures linked to the Gulf Clan increased their presence in departments such as Cauca, Nariño, and Choco during the Total Peace years, something the right wing turned into one of the central pillars of its campaign.
The practical challenge for Cepeda would be proving that he can combine negotiation and coercion. Although he insists that dialogue must continue, he also speaks of modernizing intelligence capabilities and improving coordination among the Military Forces, the Police, and the Attorney General’s Office. Even so, his critics believe his proposal maintains a structural weakness: it depends on illegal groups genuinely wanting to negotiate.
Abelardo De la Espriella and the bet on hardline policies
The discourse of Abelardo De la Espriella moves in the opposite direction. His campaign turned security into its main political axis and built a narrative based on restoring order through military force, harsher criminal penalties, and direct confrontation against armed groups.
De la Espriella promises to dismantle Total Peace from the first day of government and reactivate offensive operations against guerrillas and criminal gangs. His proposals include bombing armed structures, spraying illicit crops, expanding troop numbers, and militarily retaking strategic drug trafficking corridors. He also proposes building ten maximum-security megaprison facilities for criminals linked to drug trafficking and terrorism.
One of the most controversial points of his platform is the controlled legalization of civilian gun ownership. The candidate argues that many citizens have been left defenseless in the face of rising crime and proposes easing permit restrictions under strict regulatory mechanisms.
De la Espriella’s model is clearly inspired by the security strategy of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. His campaign constantly speaks of “regaining territorial control in 90 days,” a timeframe specialists consider extremely difficult to achieve given the dimensions of Colombia’s conflict.
The main doubt surrounding his proposal lies in its legal and operational viability. Colombia faces constitutional restrictions, judicial oversight, and territorial dynamics far more complex than those in El Salvador. In addition, human rights organizations warn that a policy based exclusively on military force could increase the risks of abuses and violations of fundamental rights.
Despite this, De la Espriella has managed to connect with a sector of the electorate tired of the deterioration in security. His rise in polls reflects precisely the political impact of that discourse of authority.
Paloma Valencia and the return of Democratic Security
The uribista candidate, Paloma Valencia, is trying to recover part of the security model implemented during the governments of Álvaro Uribe, although adapted to new technological and intelligence tools.
Valencia proposes increasing troop numbers, strengthening military operations, and restoring state control in regions dominated by illegal groups. She also proposes resuming the forced eradication of illicit crops and suspending negotiations with armed organizations that continue committing crimes.
Her platform incorporates elements of technology applied to security, including artificial intelligence for risk detection, strengthening criminal information systems, and digital tools for monitoring public contracting and corruption. Part of her narrative seeks to differentiate itself from De la Espriella’s more radical hardline stance by presenting an image of security with institutional backing.
However, Valencia faces an evident political difficulty: much of public opinion associates the uribista model with controversial episodes such as the “false positives” scandal and military excesses during the war against guerrilla groups. Although the candidate insists that her proposal focuses on restoring authority within the legal framework, her opponents question whether she truly represents renewal or simply a return to the past.
In practical terms, Valencia is betting on a combination of public force, technological intelligence, and judicial strengthening. Her diagnosis is that Total Peace weakened the state’s deterrent capacity and allowed criminal economies to grow. That is why she insists that any negotiation process must be subordinated to verifiable results in reducing violence and the genuine dismantling of illegal structures.
A recurring issue in decades of Colombian politics
Although it is not the only hot issue, security is one of the main points of discussion in the 2026 presidential campaign. Ivan Cepeda defends the continuity of a model based on negotiation and social transformation that would have to achieve what Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace policy failed to accomplish.
Abelardo De la Espriella, meanwhile, proposes a radical break through a strategy of direct confrontation. The right-wing populist candidate has made this issue the backbone of his electoral campaign, following a Bukele-style model — like that of President Nayib Bukele in El Salvador — hoping to obtain the same level of public support achieved by the Central American president.
Finally, Paloma Valencia is attempting to rebuild democratic security — the policy that brought President Alvaro Uribe to great levels of popularity during his two terms — under a more institutional and technological format and, in reality, much closer to De la Espriella’s approach than to the model of the left.
After the peace agreement signed ten years ago with the FARC, the country’s main armed group at the time, Colombia’s armed conflict evolved into a struggle involving several organizations without political status, with whom dialogue has proven to be complex.
Indeed, talks with the ELN failed both during the government of right-wing President Ivan Duque (2018–2022) and under left-wing President Gustavo Petro (2022–2026).
Added to all this is what is considered common crime: extortion and theft that worsen the overall perception of security, especially in major cities. This phenomenon is even more complex than that of the large armed groups, which directly affect certain specific areas of the country. In the opposite sense, common crime ravages Colombian cities, where citizens demand concrete responses from their leaders.
The outcome of these consequential elections will define not only the country’s political direction, but also the type of relationship the Colombian state will have with the armed conflict in the coming years.